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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

ROBERT A. DYER,

:

Case No, 890729-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a guilty plea to three counts of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,
two of which are second degree felonies and one of which is a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1990); and one count of unlawful possession of
marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 59-19-105 and 59-19-106 (Supp.
1989).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), as the appeal is
from a district court in a criminal case not involving a
conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the notice of appeal in this case was filed

in a timely manner, giving this Court jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.

2.

Whether defendant entered a conditional guilty plea

to properly preserve the suppression issue for appeal.
3.

Whether the affidavit in support of the search

warrant in this matter was sufficient to establish probable
cause.
4.

Whether the magistrate who issued the search

warrant independently found that the affidavit established
probable cause.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 1, 1989, a search warrant was obtained and
served on th€> residence of defendant (Record of case no. 6380
[hereinafter R.] at 9-20, copies of the search warrant and
affidavit are attached to this brief as Addendum A and Addendum
B).

Based on the evidence seized during that search, defendant

was charged on February 3, 1989 with one count of distribution of
a controlled substance, a second degree felony; one count of
arranging for distribution of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony; three counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, two of which are second
degree felonies and one of which is a third degree felony; three
counts of unlawful possession of controlled substances without
tax stamps affixed, all third degree felonies; one count of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; and one count of
failure to stop at the command of a police officer, a third
degree felony (Record of case no. 6378 at 9, and R. at 30-32).
-2-

The record does not contain a written motion to
suppress the evidence.

The trial court conducted a suppression

hearing on August 24, 1989 (R. at 38 and transcript of hearing
which is contained, but unnumbered, in the record on appeal).

No

evidence was taken at that hearing, both parties relying on
argument and on the preliminary hearing transcript, a portion of
which is found in the file for case no. 6378.

On August 28,

1989, both the State and defendant filed memoranda in support of
their positions on the motion to suppress (R. at 39-45 and 4656).

On August 28, 1989, the court entered its written ruling,

denying the motion (R. at 57-63; a copy of the ruling is attached
as Addendum C).
Also, on August 24, 1989, before the ruling on the
motion to suppress, defendant entered into a plea agreement.

On

that date he pled guilty in the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S.
Page, District Judge, presiding.

Defendant pled guilty to four

of the counts against him in case no. 6380.

In return, the

remaining counts of 6380 and the single count in case no. 6378
were dismissed (R. at 65). Nothing in the record indicates that
the pleas were entered conditionally.
On October 24, 1989, defendant was sentenced to a
prison term of one to fifteen years for the second degree felony
charges, and zero to five years on the third degree felony
charge.

He was not ordered to pay a fine.

He was ordered to pay

restitution in the amount of $4,361.82 to the Bountiful Police
Department, and $588.25 to the Layton Police Department.
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The

sentences were to run concurrently (R. at 82). On October 27,
1989, defendant filed a motion for a certificate of probable
cause, which the State did not oppose and which the court granted
(R. at 71-73).
On December 7, 1989, an order to show cause was issued
for defendant for violation of the terms of his release (R. at
83-85).

The record does not indicate whether any action was

taken on the order.

On December 20, 1989, a notice of appeal,

purportedly signed October 24, 1989, was filed with the trial
court (R. at 91).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The record of this case contains little in the way of
testimony.

The file for case no. 6378 contains a partial

transcript of the preliminary hearing (Record of case no. 6378 at
17).

That transcript deals primarily with the time of the

execution of the search warrant, the location of substances found
in defendant's residence, the questioning of defendant, and the
arguments of counsel at the preliminary hearing.

The transcript

does not contain anything that addresses the issues raised by
defendant on appeal.
The transcript of the suppression hearing likewise does
not contain any testimony.

It contains the arguments of counsel

on the issue of suppression with minor citations to a preliminary
hearing transcript which is not contained in the record on
appeal.
The only evidence of a factual nature in the record is
the search warrant and affidavit in support thereof (R. at 14-15

-4-

and 16-20; Addendum A and Addendum B).

The affidavit indicates

that the affiant, Lon F. Brian, had received information from
another officer that a confidential informant had told the other
officer that the informant had purchased an ounce of cocaine from
defendant approximately two weeks prior to the writing of the
affidavit.

The informant had observed approximately nine ounces

of cocaine at defendant's residence at the time of his purchase
(R. at 17). Officer Brian also wrote that he had received
information from four other people in the past that defendant was
trafficking in drugs (R. at 17). One of those four persons had
been in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989, and had seen
drug paraphernalia and marijuana at the home (R. at 17).
Defendant had told this second informant that defendant was
getting more marijuana in a few days (R. at 17-18).
A third informant had told Officer Brian in November of
1987 that defendant had sold pound quantities of controlled
substances to the third informant (R. at 18). On February 1,
1989, Officer Brian had been present during a communication
between a fourth informant and defendant during which defendant
had agreed to sell one ounce of cocaine to the fourth informant
(R. at 18). Initial contact between this fourth informant and
defendant had been by telephone to defendant's residence (R. at
18).

Officers observed the meeting between this informant and

defendant and pursued defendant in his vehicle.

During the

pursuit, the officers saw defendant throw baggies from his
vehicle.

When the vehicle was stopped after a high speed chase,

the informant told officers that the baggies contained cocaine
(R. at 18).
-5-

The informant who had been in defendant's house on
January 23, 1989 was considered trustworthy because he had
provided information to officers in the past which had resulted
in the conviction of over 20 people (R. at 18). Officer Brian
affirmed that his experience and training as a drug enforcement
officer revealed that drug dealers often kept records of their
dealings (R. at 18-19).

He also indicated that drug dealers

often kept paraphernalia for the use and distribution of
controlled substances (R. at 19). Based on the ease with which
controlled substances can be destroyed, Officer Brian asked for a
warrant to be served night or day, without previous notice to any
occupants (R. at 19).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The record in this matter reveals that defendant was
sentenced on October 27, 1989.

His notice of appeal was not

filed until December 20, 1989, well past the time for filing an
appeal.

Nothing in the record indicates that defendant sought

for or received an extension of the time for filing; neither were
there any motions which would have tolled the running of the
time.
Defendant pled guilty to four counts in this matter.
The record indicates only that he pled guilty; it does not show
that the plea was conditional.

An unsigned minute entry says

only that defendant pled guilty and the court accepted the plea.
If this Court reaches the merits of defendant's
arguments on appeal, the record demonstrates that the affidavit
supports the trial court's finding that the search warrant was

-6-

issued on a showing of probable cause.

The affidavit must show

only a probability that the controlled substances would be found
at defendant's residence; the affiant does not have to show
certain knowledge.
stale.

The information in the affidavit was not too

Indeed, the length of time indicated by the different

reports which came to officers revealed only that defendant's
involvement was long term and ongoing.

The information was shown

to be trustworthy by the use of reliable informants and the
intertwining of the information.
Because the affidavit supported a finding of probable
cause, the magistrate who signed the search warrant acted in a
neutral and detached fashion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT FILED
UNTIL FIFTY-FIVE DAYS AFTER HE WAS SENTENCED;
CONSEQUENTLY, HIS APPEAL IS UNTIMELY AND
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Defendant was sentenced on October 24, 1989 (R. at 7475 and 82). On October 27, 1989, defendant's application for a
certificate of probable cause was granted (R. at 73).
Defendant's notice of appeal was not filed with the district
court until December 20, 1989, although it carries the signature
date of October 24, 1989 (R. at 91). A letter from Mr. Yengich's
secretary indicates that the notice was a duplicate "of the
Robert Dyer appeal papers" (R. at 90). Nothing in the file
indicates an earlier filing of the notice; nor is there any
motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
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Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
mandates that "the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from" (emphasis added).

This Court had occasion to

explain this rule in In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

In that case, this Court said:
In determining whether a notice of appeal is
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in
an appellate court, this court must be bound
by the filing date indicated on the notice of
appeal transmitted to it by the trial court.
This requirement is implicit in provisions of
our rules governing timeliness of an appeal.

781 P.2d at 1288 (emphasis added).

In that case, the juvenile

asked this Court to presume from the procedure by which the case
had arrived at this Court that the lower court had determined
that the notice was timely.

This Court said:

If the procedures for initiating an appeal
set forth in our rules are to have any
practical significance, a determination of
timeliness cannot be presumed or inferred
from actions of the trial court.

[I]f transmittal of the letter [from the
juvenile's counsel explaining why the notice
had gone first to the district court and was
thus late to the juvenile court] was intended
as an indication to this court that the trial
court determined the appeal to have been
timely received, that determination should be
specifically indicated by an order of the
trial court or by the date of filing stamped
on the notice of appeal.
781 P.2d at 1289.
In the present case, the notice of appeal is stamped as
filed on December 20, 1989, some fifty-five days after
-8-

defendant's sentencing.

The letter from Mr. Yengich's secretary

implies that the originals were sent to the district court
earlier.

This Court cannot infer that that is correct or that

the trial court has deemed the December 20th filing to be timely.
This appeal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, or, at
most, remanded to the district court for a determination of
timeliness, as was done in M.S.
POINT II
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION
THAT DEFENDANT PRESERVED THE SUPPRESSION
ISSUE FOR APPEAL BY FILING A CONDITIONAL
GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant states that he entered a conditional guilty
plea to four of the charges against him (Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 5). Nothing in the record supports
the claim that a conditional plea was entered pursuant to State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

As with the

case of State v. Bobo, No. 890606-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 19,
1990), the record contains only an unsigned minute entry which
reads:
This is the time set for Change of Plea.
The defendant is present and is represented
by Ron Yengich. William McGuire is present
on behalf of the State of Utah.
Court explains rights. Defendant will
plead guilty to Counts 2, 3, 4 & 7 of Case
#6380. Pursuant to a negotiation the other
counts will be dismissed along with Case
#6378.
Defendant pleads guilty. Court finds that
he has done so knowingly and intelligently
and the facts support the plea. Defendant is
referred to AP&P for pre-sentence
investigation and sentence is set for October
3, 1989.
Defendant will remain on bail.
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(R. at 65). Two months later, the trial court signed a
certificate of probable cause (R. at 71). The minute entry for
the sentencing hearing reads, in pertinent part:
Court finds that there is a viable issue
for appeal. State does not object to a
Certificate of Probable Cause.
(R. at 73). The procedure in this case follows almost exactly
the one rejected in Bobo.

As in that case, the record before

this Court is wholly inadequate to establish that defendant's
guilty plea was conditional.

Bobo, slip op. at 2.

Rules 11 and 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals place? the burden on the appellant to provide an adequate
record on appeal.

This Court should not consider allegations

that are based on matters outside the record on appeal.

As the

Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah
1986):
If an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, this Court must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below. State
v. Robbins, Utah, 709 P.2d 771 (1985); State
v. Jones, Utah 657 P.2d 1263 (1982).
718 P.2d at 405.

The record in the present case states that

The State recognizes that this Court in footnote one of Bobo
seemed to place an obligation on the State to determine, off the
record, whether the State and the trial court had consented to a
conditional plea. This has never been the State's obligation.
As noted in the body of this brief above, the obligation has
always been on the appellant to provide an adequate record to
support his or her claims. It has always been improper for the
parties to argue matters not contained in the record. E.g. State
v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297, (Utah 1986).
In the present case, it is the obligation of defendant to
provide a transcript of the change of plea hearing or some other
documentation upon which this Court can determine whether the
plea was indeed conditional.
-10-

defendant pled guilty and the court accepted that plea as knowing
and voluntary and supported by the facts of the case.
must assume the regularity of that finding.

This Court

An assumption that

the guilty plea was conditional is not supported by the record.
Therefore, the suppression issue is not properly before this
Court.

Bobo, slip op. at 3.
POINT III
IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS OF
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL, THE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT IN
THIS CASE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO ISSUE THE WARRANT.
Based upon the State's arguments in the preceding

points, this Court should not address the merits of defendant's
claim that the evidence seized should have been suppressed
because the issuance of the search warrant was not supported by
probable cause.

However, if the Court decides to address that

claim, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion
to suppress.
Defendant contends that the affidavit for the search
warrant issued for his residence lacked any indicia of probable
cause and therefore the warrant was issued in violation of his
fourth amendment rights.

More specifically, defendant argues

that there was no information to show that any of the evidence
seized would be located in his residence (Br. of App. at 8).
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant raised this issue in a suppression hearing
before the trial court, and the court concluded:
[F]rom all of the information set forth in
the affidavit taken from a common sense point
-11-

of view there was a fair probability that
defendant resided in the residence in
question and that controlled substance,
paraphernalia, and records of drug
trafficking would be found therein.
Even assuming for the purposes of argument
that the affidavit in question was inadequate
to support the warrant, the court concludes
that evidence obtained in the case would be
admitted under the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule as set forth in U.S. v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
(R. at 60-61 and included as Addendum C). To overturn this
ruling, this Court must find that the trial court's factual
evaluation underlying its decision to deny defendant's motion to
suppress was clearly erroneous.
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
This Court addressed the standard

of review in State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App.
1989):
When a search warrant is subsequently
challenged on the grounds that it was issued
without the requisite probable cause . . .
"the fourth amendment does not require that
the reviewing court conduct a de novo review
of the magistrate's probable cause
determination." [State v.] Babbell, 770 P.2d
[987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the
determination is "whether the magistrate had
a substantial basis to conclude that in the
totality of circumstances, the affidavit
adequately established probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant." State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, in making this determination, the
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's
decision "great deference." ^d. (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, []).

Our role in reviewing that determination is
limited: "Because a trial court is in an
advantageous position to assess witness
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual
assessment underlying a decision to . . .
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly
-12-

appears that the lower court was in error. "•
[State v.1 Droneberq, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)]
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when
the trial court's factual assessment is
against the clear weight of the evidence or
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
783 P.2d at 57. The record in the present case supports the
finding of the trial court.

Since the court's ruling upholding

the search warrant is not clearly erroneous, this Court should
defer to the trial court's determination.
B.

PROBABLE CAUSE

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation" prior to issuance of a search warrant.

State v.

Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765
2
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

Accordingly, probability, not conclusive

evidence, is the basis upon which a search warrant may be issued.
When the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of probable cause
in State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (1971), it stated:
[I]t is not necessary that the affiant have
certain knowledge of the commission of crime
or of the location of evidence incident
thereto. It is only required that there be
sufficient knowledge of the probability
thereof that a person of reason and prudence
would act thereon.
2
In footnote 1 of appellant's brief he states that the Utah
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to give broader
protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
However, since appellant has not provided any argument for a
different analysis of this issue under the state constitutional
provision, this Court should also only address the issue under
the federal constitutional provision. See State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
-13-

490 P.2d at 337.

Subsequently, the Court has said, "probability,

not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant."
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977).

State v.

See also United States v.

Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause for a
search warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the
policeman's affidavit.").

More recently, in State v. Anderton,

668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the
totality-of-the-circumstance analysis espoused by the United
States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
In addressing the sufficiency of a probable cause finding, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .
concluding]" that probable cause existed.
462 U.S. at 238-239 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (I960)).

Based on the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit in question, the issuing magistrate in the present case
could and did make a probable cause determination with a
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing.
requires.

This is all that the fourth amendment

Gates, 462 U.S. at 237.
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In the case at bar, the affiant had information
obtained from an informant, dating as far back as November of
1987, that defendant was involved in the sale of pound quantities
of marijuana and hallucinogens (R. at 18). Defendant contends
that this information was stale and therefore did not establish
probable cause.

This argument may have had merit if the 1987

information was all that the affidavit contained.

However, the

affidavit contained additional information including that another
individual had been in defendant's residence two weeks prior to
the writing of the affidavit and had seen defendant with nine
ounces of cocaine.

In addition, four other informants had told

officers of defendant's involvement in drug distribution.

As

recently as eight days prior to the affidavit, one of the four
informants had been in defendant's house and had observed drug
paraphernalia and marijuana.

Also, the affiant had been present

the day of the affidavit when defendant made arrangements to sell
cocaine to an informant.

The affiant had also seen defendant

throw baggies of cocaine from his vehicle during a high speed
chase (R. at 17-18).

This information, taken as a whole,

demonstrated that defendant's drug involvement had been ongoing.
The continuous nature of the drug activity made the passage of
time less important to the affidavit.

As the Tenth Circuit Court

said in United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972):
[W]here the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and
continuous nature, a course of conduct, the
passage of time becomes less significant.
461 F.2d at 287.

In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987),

the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] mere passage of time does
-15-

not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant."
732 P.2d at 131.

The 1987 activity, together with the activity

occurring up to the date of the search in the present case,
established a course of conduct and a continuing nature of
defendant's drug involvement.

Thus, when taken in conjunction

with more recent evidence, the 1987 activity legitimately
contributed to establishing probable cause.
As recently as two weeks prior to the issuance of the
warrant, an individual, who will be called Informant I for
clarity, observed nine ounces of cocaine at defendant's residence
and purchased one ounce of cocaine on that same day (R. at 17).
Defendant asserts the credibility and reliability of this
informant was insufficient to establish probable cause.

Case law

does not require that credibility and reliability be proven to a
certainty, but instead, requires that the affidavit be reviewed
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Anderton.

In United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d

957 (8th Cir. 1986), the court stated:
Our touchstone is "probability," and not
"certainty," and one-hundred-percent
reliability on the part of [the informants]
was not crucial to issuance of the warrant.
793 F.2d at 963.

In the Anderton case, the Utah Supreme Court

upheld the trial court's finding of probable cause for a search
warrant.

On the issue of informant reliability, the court said:
Resad as a whole, and in a common-sense way,
the affidavit sets forth sufficient
underlying circumstances to support the
conclusions reached by the affiant and to
support the reliability and credibility of
the informant.

-16-

668 P.2d at 1260 (footnote omitted).

Because Informant I's

assertions were verified by substantial independent proof of
defendant's drug trafficking involvement, under the totality-ofthe-circumstances standard, there was sufficient information for
the issuing magistrate to make a common sense determination that
the information was reliable.

See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d

1362, 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
On January 23, 1989, an individual who will be called
Informant II observed narcotic paraphernalia and small quantities
of marijuana at defendant's residence.

On that same occasion,

defendant told Informant II that defendant would be receiving
additional quantities of controlled substances, including
marijuana, in the next few days (R. at 17-18).

Defendant asserts

that this information was not sufficient to establish probable
cause.

Defendant cites State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W.Va.

1986), to support his assertion.

In Adkins, the court said:

The factual basis for the affidavit in
[Adkins] was solely based on an undisclosed
confidential informant whose only fact
statement as reported by the officer making
the affidavit was that he had observed
marijuana inside the . . . structure and in
the controll (sic) of [defendant].
346 S.E.2d at 774.
from Adkins.

The case at bar is clearly distinguishable

Unlike the affidavit in Adkins, the affidavit in

the case at bar is not conclusory.

Nor is the information

relating to the presence of controlled substances at defendant's
residence based solely on the opinion of the affiant.

There was

reliable and corroborating information from a number of
informants, at least one of whom had been involved in prior
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narcotics transactions resulting in the arrest and conviction of
over 20 persons (R. at 18). Further, on February 1, 1989, the
day the search warrant was executed, the affiant was present
during recorded communication between defendant and an individual
who will be called Informant III, wherein defendant agreed to
provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the informant.

The

affiant had information that the communication was initiated by a
telephone call to defendant's residence (R. at 18). Following
the drug transaction arranged between Informant III and defendant
was a high speed chase wherein the affiant observed baggies being
thrown out of the t™-'"1 driven b^r deferd^^t '*>. at 18).
Subsequently, the informant who was in defendant's truck during
the chase told the affiant that defendant had had cocaine but had
thrown it out the window (R. at 18).
Based on these facts, it vcvl- be unreasonable to
conclude that the affidavit was so conclusory as to render it a
"bare bones" affidavit like that condemned by the Adkins court.
Instead, common sense dictates that the information contained in
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause.
Defendant also contends that because the sale of one
ounce of cocaine to Informant III on February 1, 1989 was to take
place in defendant's vehicle, there was not probable cause for
issuing a search warrant to search his residence.

However, Tapp

makes clear that the standard is probability, not certain
knowledge.

Under the circumstances, the affiant had a reasonable

belief that drugs and drug paraphernalia would be located at
defendant's residence.

Because a reasonable, prudent person

-18-

would act on such a suspicion, probable cause for issuing a
search warrant was established and defendant's fourth amendment
rights were not infringed upon.
POINT IV
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY PERFORMED HIS
FUNCTION AS A NEUTRAL AND DETACHED JUDGE IN
APPROVING THE WARRANT IN THIS CASE.
As discussed in Point III, under the totality of the
circumstances analysis, the police officer-affiant presented
sufficient facts in his affidavit upon which the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing.

The Court in United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897 (1984), stated:
It is the magistrate's responsibility to
determine whether the officer's allegations
establish probable cause and, if so, to issue
a warrant comporting in form with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
468 U.S. at 921.

Defendant contends that the magistrate in the

case at bar abandoned his neutral role and became an ally of the
police and simply "rubber stamped" the affiant's statement.

This

argument fails because, as previously discussed, the affiant's
statements established probable cause.

The affidavit was not

conclusory, but was based on independent facts derived from
reliable and corroborating information from a number of
informants, as well as the personal observations of the affiant.
Therefore, the magistrate could and did make a common sense
determination that
given all the circumstance set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
-19-

[was] a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime [would] be found in a
particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
Since the affidavit in this case established probable
cause, the magistrate did not act as a rubber stamp in signing
the warrant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J?"' '"'" day of March, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Ronald J. Yengich, YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS, 175 East 400
South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ,-"?-"' day of
March, 1990.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
residence located at
181 Cushing Way
Layton, Utah
occupied by Robert Dyer

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

SEARCH WARRANT

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Lon Brian, investigator with the Davis Metro Narcotic Strike
Force, that he has reason to believe that in the below-described
premises there are items which constitute evidence of the
commission of a crime.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime or night time to
make immediate search of the premises described as:

The residence located at
181 Cushing Way
Layton, Utah
Occupied by Robert Dyer
and search for the following property:
Controlled Substances
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal
tubes used to ingest controlled substances.
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest
or facilitate the sale of controlled substances.
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded
narcotics trafficking.
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other
items evidencing ownership, occupation or
control of the above premises of rooms therein.
And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this
Court.

•w«,'U ^
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GiVen under my hand ana dated this lsf day of

February, 1989.
>
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(Uy^-t-^-^--^

Circuit Court Judge
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ADDENDUM B

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84 025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
In Re: Search of the
residence located at
181 Cushing Way
Layton, Utah
occupied by Robert Dyer

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

Before the honorable K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge,
the undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that
he has probable cause to believe that on the premises which are
described as:
The residence located at
181 Cushing Way
Layton, Utah
Occupied by Robert Dyer

there is now certain property described as:
Controlled Substances
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal
tubes used to ingest controlled substances.
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest
or facilitate the sale of controlled
substances.
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded
narcotics trafficking.
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other
items evidencing ownership, occupation or
control of the above premises or rooms therein.

The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are as
follows:
1. That the affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro
Narcotics Strike Force and is familiar with the facts presented
herein.
2. Affiant received information from Richard Bliss, an
officer with Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force that a
confidential informant told him approximately two weeks ago that
Robert Dyer had in his residence at 181 Cushing Way, Layton,
Utah, approximately nine ounces of cocaine, one of which the
informant purchased.
3.

Affiant has received information in the past from four

other informants that Mr. Dyer was trafficking in controlled
substances.
4.

Affiant on January 23, 1989, had one of the four

informants in Mr. Dyer's residence where narcotic paraphernalia
and small quantities of marijuana were observed.

The informant

further indicated that Mr. Dyer told him that he would be
obtaining additional controlled substances, specifically

marijuana, in the next few days.
5.

Affiant further had information from a third informant

in November of 1987 that the informant had been purchasing pound
quantities of marijuana and hallucinogenics from Mr. Dyer.
6.

On February 1, 1989, affiant was present during recorded

communication between an informant and Mr. Robert Dyer wherein
Mr. Dyer agreed to provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the
informant.

The informant was given instructions to contact Mr.

Dyer from a payphone on SR 193 and Fairfield in Layton.

Affiant

was informed by Officer Bliss that the initial contact with Mr.
Dyer had been by telephone to Mr. Dyer's residence.
7.

The informant then indicated that he was to meet Dyer at

another location and officers of the Davis Metro Narotics Strike
Force observed the informant inside a white truck being driven byMr. Dyer.
8.

After the observations, affiant engaged in a high speed

chase and observed baggies being thrown out of the truck.

The

truck was finally stopped and affiant spoke with the informant
who stated that Mr. Dyer had the cocaine but threw it out of the
window.
9.

Affiant believes that the informant that was in the

residence on January 23 is reliable as he has been involved in
prior narcotics transactions that have resulted in the arrest and
conviction of over 20 persons.
10. Based on affiant's experience and training as a
narcotics officer, a drug dealer will often keep records and

accounts of their transactions, and proceeds of their dealings
will appear in sales receipts and bank records.

These same

receipts and bank records show ownership and occupancy of
the residence and its contents.
8. Based on affiant's experience and training as a
narcotics officer during the last three years it is often the
case that a drug dealer or user
will keep miscellaneous paraphernalia to facilitate their use of
narcotics, and the dispensing of them.
records of drug transactions

The dealer will also keep

and evidence of ownership or

residency of the premises within the residence itself.
9.

Affiant believes from the foregoing that there is

probable cause to believe that there are controlled substances
and other items as identified herein within the above mentioned
residence.

Affiant further knows that the residence will need to

be searched during the nighttime as Mr. Dyer has been arrested
and may contact someone to eliminate any controlled substances
that may be within the residence.

Affiant is further aware that

controlled substances may be easily destroyed and concealed and
that dealers in controlled substances often maintain weapons at
their residence for use in protecting themselves and their
controlled substances and therefore requests authorization for
entry of the residence without announcing the officer's purpose
or identity.

WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above described

premises and the seizure

of any of the said items and that the same be authorized for
issuance in the nighttime without notice of purpose or authority
~

^

Subscribed and sworn to me this 1st day of February,
1989.

D

/

<_

jM
Judge
Circuit Co ufrt Judc

ADDENDUM C
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

lJ

' •' c

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
- ^

- ~

THE STATE OF UTAH,
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
Plaintiff,
:

TO

SUPPRESS

:

Case No.

vs.
ROBERT A. DYER,
Defendant.

6378

fi^io)

:

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the above-entitled court and the court having
reviewed that portion of the transcript referred to by counsel
and having reviewed the affidavit and search warrant and
memorandum submitted by counsel and being fully advised in the
premises hereby rules as follows.
In the first instance, the court recognizes that the
traditional test of Aguilar and Spinelli, which set out a two
prong test which had to be met to establish the reliability of an
informant as a basis for a search warrant, has now been abandoned
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah.

Spinelli vs. The United States 393 US 410, 21 L Ed 2d

637 (1969), Aguilar vs. Texas 378 US 108, 12 L ed 2d 723 (1964);
Illinois vs. Gates 462 US 213 (1983); The State of Utah vs.
Anderton

Utah

, 668 Pacific 2nd 1258 (1983).

The hypertechnical requirements of the Spinelli and
Aguilar have now given way to a common sense interpretation based
on a totality of the circumstances.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gates Supra it states
sitsuccinctly when it held:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sensed decision whether, given all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the "voracity and basis of knowledge" of the
person supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that the contraband or evidence of crime in a
particular place.
Our own Supreme Court in discussing the common-sense
approach stated in the Anderton case quoting from Spinelli:
That probability and not prima facia showing
a criminal activity is the standard of probable
cause
in judging probable cause issuing
magistrates are not to be confused by niggardly
limitations or by restriction of the use of their
common sense, and their determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by the
reviewing courts.
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant
herein questioned, the warrant contained the following
information.
The affiant had received information from four
different informants that defendant was trafficking in controlled
substance.
Affiant was informed by a particular informant that he
had purchased pound quantities of marijuana and hallucinogens
from defendant in 1987.

Detective Bliss, an associate of the affiant's on the
task force, reported that one of his informants had told him that
he had been in the Dyer home at 181 Cushing Way in Layton
approximately two weeks prior to the date of the affidavit and
that defendant had in his possession nine ounces of cocaine at
the residence and that the informant had purchased one of the
ounces.
That one of the four informants had told the affiant
that he was in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989 and had
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

That the defendant

had represented that he expected to receive additional controlled
substance specifically marijuana within the next few days.
That said confidential informant had previously been
involved in the arrest and conviction of over 20 persons involved
in drug transactions.
That the affiant was present on February 1, 1989, the
date of the search warrant, and recorded a conversation between
the informant and the defendant wherein defendant agreed to
provide one ounce of cocaine to the informant.
The defendant instructed the informant to go to a
certain pay phone to call the defendant.
The informant advised the affiant that he was required
to meet the defendant at another location.
The affiant observed informant in a truck driven by the
defendant.

A high-speed chase ensued with the affiant pursuing.
Affiant observed baggies being thrown out of the truck.
truck was eventually stopped.

The

Informant informed the affiant

that defendant had the cocaine but threw it out the window during
the chase.
Affiant was an experienced officer working on the drug
task force, was experienced with the drug scene and the manner of
doing business therein.
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was aware
that drug dealers often keep accounts of transactions, proceeds
from deals, and bank records at their place of residence.
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was also
aware that drug dealers often keep drug paraphernalia at their
residence to facilitate the use and dispensing of controlled
substances.
Affiant was informed by a fellow officer, Detective
Bliss, that the initial contact with the defendant had been by
telephone at his residence.
With the foregoing facts, this court concludes that
from all of the information set forth in the affidavit taken from
a common sense point of view there was a fair probability that
defendant resided in the residence in question and that
controlled substance, paraphernalia, and records of drug
trafficking would be found therein.

Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the
affidavit in question was inadequate to support the warrant, the
court concludes that evidence obtained in the case would be
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
as set forth in

U.S. vs. Leon 468 US 897, 82 L ed 2nd 677

(1984).
The Leon Court recognized a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule and in so doing ruled that inherently
trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate may be
admitted even though said warrant is ultimately found to be
defective.
In so doing the Leon Court recognized that the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safe
guard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.

It

was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish
errors of judges and magistrates.
The court went on the say that suppression of evidence
obtained pursuant to a defective warrant should only be ordered
on a case by case basis and only in the unusual case in which the
exclusion would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
As that court stated, there is no deterrent effect
where the offending officers acted in an objectively reasonable
belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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In discussing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule, the court indicated that the rule assumes that the police
have engaged in willful or at least negligent conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right; where the official action
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrent
rational loses much of its force.
In the matter here before the Court, the warrant was
properly executed, the officer searched only those places and for
those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by
the warrant.
The record and the evidence is devoid of any indication
that the affiant misled by information that affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of truth; or that the magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role, or that the warrant was based on an affidavit so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
This court believes that the officers in this case
acted with objective, good faith in obtaining the warrant and
acted reasonably within the scope thereof and that, therefore,
even assuming that the affidavit was defective to exclude the
evidence so obtained would not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any manner, but would only tend to make the
officers less willing to do their job in the future.

Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to
suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

2£>^ day of August,

A.D., 1989.

BY THE COURT:

,/^wi

Judg^
District Cotart
Cobrt Judg
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling on the
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day of August, 1989, postage

prepaid to the following:
Davis County Attorney
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Ronald J. Yengich
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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